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Abstract
Background: Biological organisms and their components are better conceived within categories
based on similarity rather than on identity. Biologists routinely operate with similarity-based
concepts such as "model organism" and "motif." There has been little exploration of the
characteristics of the similarity-based categories that exist in biology. This study uses the case of
the discovery and classification of zinc finger proteins to explore how biological categories based
in similarity are represented.
Results: The existence of a category of "zinc finger proteins" was based in 1) a lumpy gradient of
similarity, 2) a link between function and structure, 3) establishment of a range of appearance
across systems and organisms, and 4) an evolutionary locus as a historically based common-ground.
Conclusion: More systematic application of the idea of similarity-based categorization might
eliminate the assumption that biological characteristics can only contribute to narrow
categorization of humans. It also raises possibilities for refining data-driven exploration efforts.
Introduction
Biological beings can be understood as physical matter
arranged in particular sets of patterns that create character-
istics different from other physical matter. These patterns
have been described as including form replication, devel-
opmental differentiation, boundary maintenance, nested
hierarchical order, negative entropy, and representation-
ally guided movement, among others [Ch. 4, especially
Table [1]]. As Ernst Mayr observed, a notable consequence
of these unique characteristics has been that scientific
efforts to understand biological beings have required dif-
ferent research assumptions and processes than other sci-
entific endeavors, most notably classical physics [2]. One
of the key changes in scientific assumptions wrought by
the blossoming of biology has been a shift from identity
to similarity as a basis for classification and generaliza-
tion. Unlike fluorine atoms or muons, which have histor-
ically been presumed to be identical within their classes,
no two biological beings are exactly the same. Biologists
therefore routinely use similarity-based concepts, such as
"model organism" and "motif", both as research tools and
as modes of explanation.
Despite the widespread use in biology of categories based
on similarities rather than identities, the idea that similar-
ity provides the central basis for classification has not yet
been thoroughly integrated into higher order conceptions
of the study of biology, or into its philosophy. The over-
whelming majority of the biologists with whom we have
interacted have articulated as their over-arching rationale
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the philosophy of science based on classical physics,
which depends on the notion of identity. Further consid-
eration of the nature of similarity-based classification is
thus warranted to facilitate its integration into practice
and a more appropriate general philosophy of biology.
This essay will begin with a brief explanation of the differ-
ence between a "classical" physics-based philosophy of
science, with its dependence on identity, and a biologi-
cally-based approach in which similarity is critical. It will
then examine the case study of the discovery of zinc finger
proteins as an illustration of the logic of similarity-based
classification in biological discovery. The essay then will
discuss two arenas in which a principled application of
the biologically-based philosophy of science has poten-
tially valuable implications. These are the use of biologi-
cally-based arguments in social discussions of the nature
of human groups and the biologically-derived approach
for data-driven discovery methods.
Biology and the philosophy of science
The understanding of the nature of physical matter devel-
oped by classical physics has long been superceded by
quantum physics and relativity theory. Nonetheless, the
philosophy of science that was developed as a conse-
quence of the early successes in physics, and which was
most famously codified by Karl Popper, [3] continues to
hold sway as the default account of "what science is" (out-
side of some sets of experts in science studies). Perhaps the
endurance of the classic account is merely a product of an
effect of primogeniture – science in an important sense
got its most visible "start" through its notable successes in
this early period, so the sense that "this is what science
must be" has a strong presumption. Perhaps, however, the
classical account endures merely or also because it coin-
cides with the simple linear cause-effect grammars built
into natural human language systems [[4], pp. 112, 172].
Whatever the causes for its survival, the classical account
of how science works and its attendant assumptions about
the nature of being have been shown to be, at the least,
highly incomplete [5]. These accounts tend to put almost
exclusive weight on "crucial experiments", which are
hypothesis-driven manipulations of the natural world,
the results of which definitely discredit a particular theo-
retical formulation. According to the most narrow formu-
lations, the hypotheses must be in quantitative form. For
the more lenient, results may actually be said to support
one theoretical account in contrast to another, rather than
merely falsify a hypothesis or even a theory.
Regardless of the formulation one applies, and although
crucial experiment is indeed an essential component of
scientific practice, experimentation accounts for only a
small proportion of the research efforts in the biological
sciences and elsewhere (from geology to empirically
driven materials science to human social sciences). Sys-
tematic observation plays a larger role (though biologists
and earth scientists routinely obscure this fact by mis-
labeling their systematic observations as "experiments").
For example, neither Darwin's theory of evolution nor
Watson and Crick's account of the structure of the double
helix were derived from crucial experiments. Watson and
Crick did rely heavily on the observational data garnered
by others, and evolutionary theory rests on a vast network
of observations and sub-crucial experiments. Further-
more, Popper's prescription that science can only be falsi-
fication is unworkable. In order to build the inter-related
superstructures that characterize all modern science, an
enormous number of facts and theories must be accepted
(albeit always provisionally). The processes by which
these facts and theories are accepted includes more obser-
vation, induction, and logical and mathematical analysis
than falsification (though falsification plays a pivotal role
in many cases).
The view of both physical matter and of scientific practice
that was developed through the research efforts of classi-
cal physics was thus errant in several respects. This essay
addresses the classical assumption of identity-based cate-
gorization. The classical view held that phenomena had
properties that were universal across time and space. As
Franz Wilzeck put it,
matter is built up from vast numbers of copies of a few
fundamental components (such as electrons, quarks,
photons, and gluons). The properties of these elemen-
tary building blocks are always and everywhere the
same – universal [6].
This universality and self-identical property meant that
mathematical laws could describe the behavior of objects
based on an invariant set of properties. On this view, all
fluorine atoms were identical, which operationally meant
that each could be expected to behave in exactly the same
way under any given set of circumstances.
This set of assumptions was never actually correct. Oxygen
and carbon atoms, for example, have different isotopes,
and specific isotopic forms have different implications in
both geologic and biological frameworks [7]. Moreover,
as with all the assumptions of classical physics, the
abstract theory never applied exactly to actual objects.
One can describe, in the abstract, what the forces on an
atom should look like, but one can never actually com-
pute those forces for a particular atom (both because of
the Heisenberg principle and for more practical, mundane
reasons). Additionally, when applying physical laws to
particular objects, a world of exceptions and exclusions
have to be countenanced (e.g. ignore friction, discount
resistance, pretend space is an absolute vacuum, etc.). InJournal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2007, 2:5 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/2/1/5
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other words, the presumption of identity was always ena-
bled only by the fact that classical physics dealt almost
exclusively with large sets of atoms, across which the vari-
ations in individuals were masked. As physicists have
begun to gain the capacity to examine atoms on the indi-
vidual level, indications have began to appear that the
inevitable small variations among atoms (arising from
contingencies such as recent histories of relationships to
other atoms that might "deform" them in a specific fash-
ion, albeit temporarily) make even atoms of a given cate-
gory "similar" rather than "identical" to one another [8].
Thus, even with regard to atoms, classical physics's
assumption that classes of items were universally identical
probably does not hold.
The tendency to treat categories as though they were col-
lections of identical elements has been attributed to the
characteristics of language [9]. Words are discrete units
that appear in common sense to be processed as self-iden-
tical. That is, our common-sense intuition leads us to pre-
sume that variations in pronunciation or typography are
"washed out" because words "refer" to stable, uniform
"ideas". Recent research using neuro-imaging techniques
has produced distributed neural network theories of lan-
guage processing that indicate this common-sense feeling
is false [10]. Because words are processed in streams that
activate different portions of neural networks in which
particular words are embedded, each activation is an acti-
vation of a somewhat different portion of the neural net-
work. Pronunciation and typography may contribute to
this variation to different extents in different congeries
[11]. The falsity of our common-sense notion, however,
has not abrogated the pervasiveness with which we apply
it. On this account, the attribution of universality and cat-
egory identity to the objects of classical physics is simply
a particularly visible and influential example of a more
pervasive error promoted by the characteristics of human
language processing.
It is with this observation, that all linguistic categories rep-
resent variable constructions rather than permanent, uni-
versal ideas, that most critiques in "science studies" end.
This basic insight forms much of the impetus for decon-
structive treatments of science (though the formulations
may vary, emphasizing for example, categories as binary
systems [12], as metaphors [13], or as other linguistic
resources [14]). Such a stopping place, however, ironically
replays the problem it alleges of classical physics; it
assumes identity among the similarities across different
categories. That is, it assumes that the matter of biological
beings, of non-biological physical matter, and of symbolic
processes are for all intents and purposes identical, and
sometimes, further, that they are a product solely of the
shared linguistic processes applied to all. Instead, it is use-
ful and materially appropriate to posit different "modes"
of being – physical, biological, symbolic, and perhaps
artificial life/intelligence – which constitute substantially
different arrangements of physical matter, and which
therefore manifest different patterns of similarities within
the categories humans constitute to discuss and manipu-
late them [1].
If some basic patterns in the similarities that underlie bio-
logical organisms can be identified, then perhaps that
information can provide useful guidance not only with
regard to the broad issues of the philosophy of biology
but also with regard to both the practice of biology and
the integration of a biological world view into our social
concepts. A case study of a classic, well-accepted, and
important biological discovery provides a place to begin
such an exploration.
Zinc finger proteins
Both when Miller, McLachlan & Klug [15] reported their
discovery of zinc finger proteins and when Laity, Lee, and
Wright [16] fifteen years later published a much broader
codification of zinc finger proteins as a class, four funda-
mental principles for making judgments of similarity-
based generalizations in biology were evident in their
reports. These included 1) a lumpy gradient of similarity,
2) a link between function and structure, 3) establishment
of a range of appearance across systems and organisms,
and 4) an evolutionary locus as a historically based com-
mon-ground. Awareness of these facets of similarity-based
generalization may enhance the ability to construct meth-
odologies and informatic systems that can, among other
innovations, better identify candidate genetic and other
motifs that play causative roles in disease.
Gradients of similarity
When Miller, McLachlan & Klug first identified what they
called the "Repetitive zinc-binding domains in the protein
transcription factor IIIA from Xenopus oocytes," they intro-
duced the rationale for the paper on the grounds that they
had found "a remarkable repeating structure within the
protein" [[15], p. 1609]. This repeating structure was not,
however, a set of identical amino acids that recurred in
series. Rather, it was a set of "roughly periodical group-
ings" (p. 1610).
By the time of Miller, McLachlan & King's discovery, the
concept of the "motif" had already become relatively
common in genetics. A "motif" was identified as a
sequence of DNA bases that were highly similar across sys-
tems or organisms. That is, the string of base pairs was not
identical from one gene to another, or from one organism
to another. Rather, there existed a small number of
"highly conserved sequences" embedded within a larger
number of sequences with more variation, but which
shared frequencies at a higher level than mere chance.Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2007, 2:5 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/2/1/5
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Even the "highly conserved sequences" were not necessar-
ily identical, but they were the same across most genes or
organisms within which the "motif" was deemed to
appear.
A motif was thus tacitly understood to be identifiable by a
gradient of similarity – a highly conserved (nearly but not
quite identical) region embedded in a region of lesser con-
served (but not random) base sequences. These gradients
were not uniform, but rather lumpy. That is, a biologically
based similarity may not manifest a smooth slope of
increasing and decreasing similarity; instead, it may fea-
ture several zones with higher concentrations of similar-
ity. This distinctive form is a product of evolutionary
forces at many scales. At the genetic scale, highly con-
served sequences appear where an important function
reduces the number of viable mutations. As one moves
away from these critical spots, a greater number of muta-
tions are tolerable. But the multiple folds of most proteins
mean that any given protein features not just one, but sev-
eral critical spots (usually spots where the protein contacts
other biological components) that tolerate little variation,
surrounded by increasingly distant spots that tolerate a
wider range of variations.
The conception of the "motif" provided a mode of gener-
alization based on a specific type of pattern recurrence,
not identity. Thus, in characterizing a set of proteins,
Miller, McClachlan & Klug had ready-to-hand a word
from the study of DNA describing a type of similarity that
fit the "repetitive zinc-binding domains" that they were
seeking to understand. They described their proteins as
showing "an exceptionally strong and regular pattern of
30-residue repeats in the sequences with four repetitions
evident in the first half of the molecule (residues 13–156)
and two more clear repeats in the second half (residues
223–276)." To the eye, this pattern looks significant. It
doesn't look like a random scatter (Fig. 1a). Establishing
the meaningfulness of the apparent patterns in a fashion
that exceeds intuition was not, however, a straightforward
manner.
The reasonable approach was to assess the likelihood of
such patterns occurring by chance as opposed to occurring
as the product of some underlying causal driver. For such
purposes, statistical methods are commonly used to com-
pare "expected" values in unbiased conditions to
"observed" values. However, as is typical in biology, it was
not trivially obvious what statistical tests were appropriate
to the case. Consequently, in the appendix on "Materials
and Methods" the authors addressed in three different
ways (for two components of their data) the potential
approaches to establishing the statistical significance of
the patterns they had observed.
Two facets of their analysis are of interest for present pur-
poses. First, one of the approaches they employed took
some advantage of the gradients of similarity that occur in
biology, as it assigned weights to scores "which die away
exponentially with distance from the center of each win-
dow." They noted, however, that "this newer method is
more suitable for dealing with gaps, but is less susceptible
to statistical analysis." This tension between the available
statistical methods of the time and the nature of similarity
gradients illustrates some enduring features that will be
addressed in the discussion of data-driven methods
below.
The second issue of interest is the argument they made for
the similarity of the 344-residue sequences. We want to be
clear that we are not criticizing their argument, because we
think it was a completely reasonable one. Instead, we are
merely pointing out that there was no self-evident test that
could or should have been used in the case. The authors
set a threshold value based on expected appearance,
which was further based on the reasonable (but not nec-
essary) assumption of their alignment of 344 selected res-
idues as the relevant comparison basis. They then noted
that the value was "exceeded not once, but 359 times in
the natural sequence and showed that there are many sig-
nificant repetitions." As was standard for that era, no esti-
mate of the number of comparisons involved was given.
359 matches certainly sounds like a lot – even overwhelm-
ing. However, because chance occurrences cumulate with
multiple testing runs, and because the number of poten-
tial testing runs in many biological cases quickly becomes
quite large, one of the things biologists have had to
become sensitized to is reporting statistics in terms of
adjustments for such accumulations. Statistical analysis,
however, offers no definitive criteria for establishing
appropriate parameters for the numbers involved (not
only the choice of how many residues 'out' the analysis
should include but also which comparisons are salient
and which extraneous and how large a correction is
required). This "multiple testing" problem is endemic to
biological phenomena because of their complexity. This
too will be addressed in more detail below.
Miller, McClachlan & Klug's identification of the motif
was not, however, grounded solely in the statistical argu-
ment about likely co-occurrence of particular sequences. It
was further bolstered by the ability to situate the similar
elements within a gradient of increasing/decreasing simi-
larity. Thus, the authors were able to focus on greater lev-
els of similarity within some units than others, noting that
"it can be seen that units 5, 9 and 2, in that order, are
clearly the most typical members of the family, and are
very like one another" (p. 1611). By abstracting above the
level of the individual base pair sequences, they were able
to identify a "characteristic Cys-Cys-His-His consensusJournal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2007, 2:5 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/2/1/5
Page 5 of 12
(page number not for citation purposes)
motif." The case for the existence of the zinc finger as a
biological type with predictable properties and actions
was also dependent on the ability to specify a function for
the sequence.
A link between form and function
An extensive debate has been conducted over whether the
existence of an identifiable form is an infallible sign of the
existence of a function for that form [17,18]. We agree
with those who suggest that identifiable forms may
endure in a species for some time beyond their evolved
functions. Nonetheless, because form so pervasively is
evolutionarily a product of function among biological
beings, the ability to link a form to a biological function
stands as evidence that the form should be understood as
a distinctive biological entity. Miller, McLachlan, and
Klug's paper is convincing (and significant) in large meas-
ure because they were able to link the self-similar entity of
the Cys-Cys-His-His motif to a potential function. As they
pointed out, the structure of the sequence appears to
resemble "fingers" that can act as "DNA-binding fingers,
linked by (flexible?) joints" (p. 1613) (Fig. 1b). They were
Amino acids in zinc fingers Figure 1
Amino acids in zinc fingers. A: In large dark rectangle, sequence of amino acids 11 to 276 in transcription factor IIIA of 
Xenotopus laevis oocytes, aligned in nine rows to show extent of repetition of repeat units. Letters below rectangle indicate 
consensus sequence derived by Miller, McLachlan, and Klug (1985); dashes in consensus sequence indicate positions of no con-
sensus. Shaded letters highlight acids that match the consensus sequence; letters in small gray rectangles indicate acids that do 
not match the consensus sequence but match at least one other acid in that position; unshaded letters match neither the con-
sensus sequence nor any other acid. Blanks indicate gaps in the alignment, with the gaps positioned to maximize match of sur-
rounding acids with the consensus sequence. Asterisks do not represent acids but indicate positions at which "insertions" 
commonly occur. Adapted from Figure 3 of Miller, McLachlan, and Klug (1985). B: Model of the arrangement of amino acids 
103 to 204 in transcription factor IIIA of Xenotopus laevis oocytes. Three complete "zinc fingers" are shown. Adapted from Fig-
ure 4 of Miller, McLachlan, and Klug (1985). Note that the amino acids that most consistently match the consensus sequence in 
A are those that serve as ligands with zinc in B.
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able to note that "a structure of this kind would explain
how a relatively small protein of 40 K can bind to a long
stretch of double-helical DNA" (p. 1613).
The ability to identify a function for a gradient of similar-
ity stands as a warrant for treating that form as an entity in
biology because functionality is a distinctive property of
biological beings. Non-biological physical entities appear
in a given form solely as a consequence of the manifesta-
tion of the balance of immediately present physical forces
and the accumulated history of these forces as they have
interacted with the particular physical entity (that is with
a set of particular atoms or a substantial subset thereof).
For example, a newly-precipitated crystal has a form dic-
tated by the interactions of the atoms within the solution
from which it precipitates, even though it will resemble
other crystals made from the same categories of atoms. In
contrast, biological entities appear in their characteristic
forms because a similar prior form included a template for
that form, which was enabled to assemble the necessary
physical matter to re-construct the form from the sur-
rounding environment. This process is called reproduc-
tion or replication, and the term "function" is used to
describe any set of interactions that increases reproduci-
bility. The vocabulary of "function" is necessary for
describing biology and central to its study, but not for the
study of naturally occurring non-biological physical mat-
ter, because this reproducibility is a unique hallmark of
biological organisms.
Asserting that biological entities have unique hallmarks
discomforts people who are devoted to defending materi-
alist or physicalist accounts of biology against "vitalism".
But the assertion of distinctive qualities to matter
arranged in biological forms does not require or entail
belief in any mysterious spirits. The assembly of the tem-
plate that allows form reproduction follows physical laws,
and the re-assembly of the "offspring" form also follows
physical laws, and both are possible only under a particu-
lar range of physical conditions. But the physical arrange-
ments that fall in the category of "biological organisms"
do have a form that can only be produced given the pres-
ence of the template, and this is not true of non-biological
physical matter. Liquids and fluids have no characteristic
form, and even solids assume a form that has no linear
causal relation to the existence of a similar form of a prior
object. The rounded pebble became a rounded pebble
instead of a jagged hunk of rock because it tumbled in a
stream, not because an older rounded pebble passed on a
template that contained a code (i.e. a complex set of phys-
ical interactions) that would re-produce that form within
a range of circumstances. The biological template may be
nothing but a bunch of physical matter arranged in a spe-
cific and complex fashion, but that arrangement does pro-
duce distinctive characteristics that physical matter
lacking such an arrangement does not manifest.
Thus, although biological forms can be said to be a prod-
uct of the cumulative balance of physical forces, they are a
product not merely of immediate forces upon a particular
set of atoms, and not merely a product of the accumulated
forces upon that subset of atoms, but also a product of the
way in which physical forces have been distributed over
time in a specific lineage of forms. Biological forms are thus
not "other than" physical matter, but rather a unique sub-
set of physical matter, whose uniqueness requires expla-
nations not required for other types of matter.
Physical forms that can be reproduced through time
appear at heightened frequencies so that reproducibility
of form becomes a physical feature that distinctively iden-
tifies biological forms. Since functions are sub-require-
ments of reproducibility and this is distinctive of biology,
decisions about whether two things belong to the same
category reasonably require not merely the statistical
recurrence of a form, but the form-function pairing.
Range of generality
If one were to find a biological phenomenon that
appeared in only one place in only one organism, this
would be a strange biological phenomenon indeed. This
is because, as far as we can tell, all life on Earth has
evolved from a common source. Thus, typically, to iden-
tify the nature of a biological entity requires identification
of the range of systems and organisms across which it
occurs (in similar, though not identical, forms). In their
original article, Miller, McLachlan, and Klug began to
chart these boundaries. They searched for the protein
within a large number of zinc enzymes and metal-
lothioneins and reported failure to find the motif there (p.
1613). They also speculated that it "would also not be sur-
prising if the same 30-residue units were later found to
occur in varying numbers in other related gene control
proteins" (1611). They were correct, although as is gener-
ally the case in biology, the more types of organisms and
systems that are investigated, the broader the degradation
of similarity, so that the form of the motif they identified
would become just one concentration of similarity within
a broader class.
Evolutionary locus
The identity of a biological phenomenon is manifested as
a gradient of similarity (usually genetic or structural) that
can be linked to a biological function and whose existence
and boundaries can be traced across systems and organ-
isms. Ultimately, however, a core part of the explanation
of a biological phenomenon is its evolution. A thing that
had not evolved could not be a biological entity (biologi-
cal entities only exist as a consequence of the template-Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2007, 2:5 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/2/1/5
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enabled lineage of forms). Consequently, in their effort to
identify this new biological entity – the zinc finger protein
– Miller, McLachlan, and Klug showed that this entity
could fit within evolutionary logics. They noted that "the
evolutionary advantages of a repeating design are proba-
bly much the same as those in many other linear proteins"
(p. 1611). They accounted for the distinctive form of the
protein set by suggesting that "Probably a single func-
tional unit that binds to a half-turn of DNA was once
evolved, and then became used in much more subtle and
specialized ways when a large number of similar units
were joined in series" (p. 1611). They even speculated
about a potential role in the pre-DNA "RNA world" for
features of the unit. Although this level of deep evolution-
ary speculation is somewhat unusual for a short, techni-
cally focused paper, such an exploration of evolutionary
fit is a logical basis for grounding the existence and iden-
tity of the new class.
The zinc finger motif 15 years after its discovery
In a review article published in Current Opinion in Struc-
tural Biology, Laity, Lee, & Wright [16] summarized the
insights produced by the explosion of research enhanced
by Miller et al.'s identification of the biological entity
"zinc finger proteins." They noted of these proteins that
"their functions are extraordinarily diverse," and that
"their structures are as diverse as their functions" (p. 39).
In a world dominated by identity-based understandings
of the classes of beings, it would not have been possible to
have characterized this extraordinary range of forms and
functions as a single entity ("zinc finger proteins"). How-
ever, the essay by Laity et al. made evident the way in
which understanding this gradient of similarity, its func-
tions, and its dispersion had contributed to "novel
insights into mechanisms of DNA binding" and of tran-
scriptional regulation (p. 39). Indeed, well before the
review was published, the zinc finger motif had become a
model of motif structure in introductory genetics text-
books [19].
Like the original article, the account of zinc fingers that
Laity, Lee, & Wright provided was an account of lumpy
gradients of similarity. At the center of the now expanded
gradient stands the "classic" Cys2His2 zinc finger identi-
fied by Miller et al. The review article provided new
descriptions of the basis of similarity that had been gained
by cross-organismal explorations. For example, it noted
that "approximately half of the known Cys2His2 zinc fin-
ger proteins contain a highly conserved linker of sequence
TGEKP" (p. 39). But the article also summarized the chart-
ing of the further edges where similarity in specific
sequences decreases, and similarity in one core element
(the appearance of zinc) came to dominate, including the
DM motif, the NC protein's "zinc knuckles," and zinc-
based elements in RNA polymerase and ribosomal pro-
teins.
The review article, like the original article, also anchored
the identity of the zinc binding proteins in functions.
Along with the expansion in form, the range of functions
for the motif had also expanded. Not only had more
knowledge been gained about the nucleic acid binding of
the "family" of proteins, but the "superfamily" of proteins
was now understood to play crucial roles in some protein-
protein interactions. Like the original article, the review
article also attended to the now much better understood
range of the motif across biological systems. Here, how-
ever, an important tension was revealed. As the breadth of
the motif's applicability grew, and its variability in struc-
ture and function became more evident, was there some
point at which identifying this phenomenon as a single
biological class became untenable? The shift from the use
of "family" in the original article to the use of "super-
family" in the second article indicated this tension.
The authors further signaled this tension and responded
to it in their concluding paragraph, saying "it is notable
that recently determined structures of several previously
uncharacterized zinc finger domains show that they are
built on common structural cores, first seen in DNA-bind-
ing zinc fingers (the Cys2His2 motif [Figure 1a], GATA-1
[Figure 2a] and the β-ribbon zinc finger motif of TFHS
[Figure [3b])" (p. 44). The coherence of the class was pre-
served by replacing a single center-point of the gradient of
Characterization of populations Figure 2
Characterization of populations. Schematic illustration 
of two populations in terms of distributions of some measur-
able parameter and in terms of the mean values for those dis-
tributions. Similarity-based characterization of these 
populations focuses on the distributions, whereas identity-
based characterization focuses on the means and treats the 
distribution as noise or as aberrant values.
Means (identity-based 
characterizations of populations)
Distributions (similarity-based
characterizations of populations)
Overlap of populationsJournal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2007, 2:5 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/2/1/5
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similarity with several different points of high local simi-
larity (thus replaying across organismal systems the
lumpy texture of the pattern of similarity that was first
observed within the original DNA sequence set). Given
the strong establishment of the forms and their functions,
the review authors no longer seemed to feel the need to
establish the potential evolutionary basis for the class. As
forms and functions become taken-for-granted, explicit
arguments indicating the consonance of the forms with
evolutionary logics may appear obvious.
The power of similarity-based generalization in 
biology and beyond
The processes involved in generalizing are quite different
when one defines fluorine as any atom with 9 protons as
compared to when one defines a zinc finger protein as
"any small, functional, independently folded domain that
requires coordination of one or more zinc ions to stabilize
its structure" [[16], p. 39]. It might be argued that the
former type of generalization is more appealing for a vari-
ety of reasons (and perhaps this is why it endures, even if
it is widely inapplicable). It is more simple, and therefore
more easily characterized as "elegant." It also seems to
offer more power. If all fluorine atoms look exactly alike
and respond exactly alike, then knowing a few things
about fluorine enables one increased control of fluorine
atoms in general. In contrast, the motif-based form of gen-
eralization common to biology can appear complex,
which is often interpreted as "messy" and thus as inele-
gant. More importantly, motif-based generalization can-
not promise the simplicity and directness of power and
control of the identity-based model. As things diverge
across a gradient of similarity, it is not clear which proper-
ties are shared where and therefore which interventions
will work how. The failure of more than two thirds of
drugs successfully tested in animals to also test success-
fully in human beings illuminates the serious limitations
and costs associated with such forms of generalization
[20].
In spite, however, of what seem to be taken as the appeal-
ing aesthetic qualities and power of the identity-based
model of generalization, in biology the similarity-based
model is simply required. This is because biological
beings are, indeed, evolved through time in families. As
evolution proceeds, systems diverge in forms and func-
tions. No two beings are exactly alike, and every being is
related to some degree. There is, therefore, truly no biolog-
ical generality that is based on identity. The next question,
however, is whether there are patterns of similarity within
biological beings that have some commonality.
This study offers a tentative answer of "yes" to that ques-
tion. The characteristic patterns of similarity in biological
organisms include gradients of similarity (with lumpy
regions of greater and lesser similarity), links between
function and formal similarity, ranges of generality, and
an evolutionary locus. However, additional research on
different discoveries in other articles presenting well-
established biological discoveries would be appropriate to
explore the generality and sufficiency of these four ele-
ments. In the interim, it seems worth elaborating the sub-
stantive implications of such a framework.
Social implications
The similarity-based nature of biological being has impor-
tant implications for the role that conclusions from biol-
ogy currently play in social debates over issues such as
gender identity, racial differences, and individual suscep-
tibility to mental illness or drug and alcohol abuse. Most
often in such arguments, "biological causes" have come to
be aligned with putatively universal patterns of form and
behavior (via identity-based reasoning). For example, it is
assumed that if there is a chromosomal difference
between men and women then "men" must be a self-iden-
tical category and "women" a distinctly different, yet also
self-identical category, each of which are identified by a
set of particular behaviors different from the behaviors of
the "opposing" category. Culture is then cast against biol-
ogy in these arguments, with culture assuming the puta-
tive role of the source of all human variation.
An understanding of biological beings as entities that
share ranges of similarities rather than identical properties
re-orients this long-standing and portentous social argu-
ment. There is no one thing that is "the Y chromosome."
Thousands of polymorphisms have been identified in the
human Y chromosome (over 250 of which are currently
reasonably well established), and many of these versions
of this chromosome predispose its bearers toward different
ranges of physical characteristics and behaviors [21].
While the average of all "Y" chromosomes (as modified by
the literally million-fold genetic backgrounds with which
they interact) may indeed produce a different "average"
range of predispositions than that manifested by the
"average" of all XX chromosome-bearers, the choice to
identify that abstract "average" as the fixed identity of the
category is a manifestation of identity thinking (the mis-
begottten logic is that all XX's must be the same, so let's
assume that the "average" is somehow the ideal; Figure 2).
As Hyde & Linn's extensive survey of sex difference
research has recently shown, in all cases but two (activity
levels and aggression) these average differences between
people of the two gender categories fell within the usual
statistical standards for small or trivial effect size, while
the ranges within both the groups "women" and "men"
are much larger [22]. The fixation on a putative identity-
basis for these two categories blinds one to the real varia-
tion among living bodies, and indeed grounds the crea-
tion of normative claims that seek to suppress thatJournal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2007, 2:5 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/2/1/5
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variation and even stigmatize and punish those who don't
inhabit the respective "means". Focusing instead on gradi-
ents of similarities does not require one to ignore com-
pletely a difference of means, but it does require one to
give appropriate attention to the range of the gradients. A
similar analysis applies to racialized groupings, sexual ori-
entation, or groupings by (dis)abilities.
A similarity-based understanding of biological classes
thus allows a re-orientation of the on-going social argu-
ment about the causation of human characteristics, so
that both biology and culture are recognized as sources of
variation. At the least, however, the re-orientation requires
recognition that because no two biological beings are
identical, biological research cannot warrant claims to
universal forms. The reorientation of our thought proc-
esses away from identity and toward expanded gradients
of similarity that is required by the nature of biological
beings has yet to be fully assimilated not only into our
social discussions, but also into biological practices. The
case of data-driven discovery provides a practical set of
examples.
Similarity and data-driven discovery
Currently, a large wave of what is often called "data-
driven" science (as opposed to hypothesis-driven experi-
ment) has come to genetic research as well as other disci-
plines. Although its appropriateness has sometimes been
challenged, [23] the approach is grounded both in the
availability of enormous piles of data in the form of DNA,
mRNA, and protein sequences and also in necessity aris-
ing from the constitution of biological features through
complexes of interacting networks that exhibit gradients
of patterned variation across the biological domain. An
enormous array of approaches are available for data-
driven research, but a key thrust of these techniques is the
use of computer programs to probe for statistical associa-
tions, either across organisms in the search for already
understood analogues or between a nucleotide sequence
and data about outcome characteristics pursuant to the
search for new causal relationships.
Similarity-driven categorization principles offer at least
three areas for potential improvement of data-driven
research approaches. First, existing approaches to data-
mining do not appear to take maximal advantage of the
information available in biological systems. Second, the
failure to apply regularly a logic of similarity has produced
a substantial amount of error and waste in biological
research, some of which might be avoidable. Third, the
characteristics of biological similarity might provide some
guidance about verification standards to be applied to
data-driven discoveries.
Use more information
The data-mining approaches with which we are familiar
are adapted to an identity-based logic rather than a logic
based on gradients of similarity. They search for a statisti-
cal association between two variables (e.g. a stretch of
DNA and a disease). While the identification of an associ-
ation is based on probabilities, rather than a 100% match,
there are no adjustments built into search algorithms that
might give higher weight to patterned variations (i.e.
"lumpiness'). One anonymous reviewer confirmed this
tendency when s/he wrote with regard to an earlier draft
of this paper, "The same Cys-Cys-His-His motif would
have been apparent if the 'gradient' was flat (i.e. all mem-
bers could have been equally like/unlike all other mem-
bers except in the key regions of the CCHH motif)." While
a true statement, this comment says that ignoring some of
the available information in the structure of biological
organisms doesn't matter. But since the gradient was not
flat, and arguably many if not most biological gradients
will not be flat, then to proceed with such an assumption
is to ignore information that might be helpful. Depending
on the object of study and the configuration of the mining
technique, the surrounding lumps of similarity may
appear as noise that obscures the highly similar compo-
nent or as a false signal that unduly amplifies it, but nei-
ther is desirable. Data-mining programs sensitive to
lumpy gradients of similarity would presumably be more
accurate at identifying biologically significant phenom-
ena. The use of sliding windows that weight similarity
across distance (as employed by Miller, McLachlan, &
King) seems to illustrate a potential track, although it is
not yet calibrated to the recurrent "lumpiness" of gradi-
ents of similarity. Often, the patterns of interest will not
be similarity merely within an individual segment of
DNA, but rather similarity structures that occur across
populations or through species trees.
Waste less, be wrong less often
The second area of opportunity relates to the error and
waste that has occurred in data-driven discovery due to
the failure to attend to similarity-based relations. A large
number of scientific – and then journalistic – articles
across the past three decades have claimed to find "a gene
for" a variety of conditions, especially socially freighted
conditions such as schizophrenia, alcoholism, brain size,
drug use, and nurturing. Later studies repeatedly have
revealed that the original results were statistical anomalies
or due to population structure. In the case of alcoholism,
for example, Conrad and Weinberg [24] have shown three
different waves of announcements of the genetic roots of
alcoholism. The strongest of the candidates for a causal
input of genetics to alcoholism produced several contra-
dictory results, and the results were eventually revealed to
be highly sensitive to population structure [25].Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2007, 2:5 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/2/1/5
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These errors, and the attendant wastage, are a product of
identity-based assumptions. Researchers went about their
efforts with the assumption that all humans were the
same except in a single causative allele for a condition.
This is not to say that this assumption was a conscious,
personal driver of their decision-making. The errant
assumption may have rested within the funding agencies
that called for such research. Or the driving force may
have been the desire to test the simplest possibilities first,
or to get the largest effects from the available data. None-
theless, because the assumption is false, and humans
come with a vast number of alleles that are arrayed in gra-
dients of similarity based on ancestry, the statistical tests
used picked up the ancestry or mere chance rather than
causative alleles. Because they neglected to account for the
similarity-based nature of the phenomenon they were
looking at, the researchers then reported ancestry-derived
or chance-derived associations as though they were causa-
tive alleles, and even if a causative allele was detected, they
had no way to separate it from noise or background struc-
ture.
Identity-based assumptions have also encouraged persist-
ence of the single-gene causation model well past any rea-
sonable point. For example, an editorial attempting to
adjudicate between a study showing a link between alco-
holism and the DRD2 receptor and a study showing no
link published in the same issue attempted to moderate
the dispute by describing the allele in question as a "mod-
ifying" gene to an as-yet-undiscovered causative gene. The
more reasonable conclusion is that there would be no sin-
gle "alcoholism gene," but rather many alleles each of
which make some relatively modest contribution in some
genetic backgrounds and some environments [26]. If
researchers had been thinking of biology in gradients of
similarity, rather than as singular identities, such quests
would not have appeared so promising, and researchers
would not have been so likely to misinterpret noise and
population structure as causative alleles.
Although these experiences have increased caution in
these specific areas, especially leading to more rigorous
controls for multiple testing, a more widely shared general
understanding of the underlying similarity-based charac-
teristics of biological phenomenon can help to reduce the
likelihood of similar tendencies in other undertakings. It
might also be possible to design verification procedures
that help to weed out spurious findings.
Verifying data-driven findings
The embarrassing errors and wastage of data-driven
approaches to finding genes related to human characteris-
tics have been highlighted by some skeptics of data-driven
approaches to scientific research. They have pointed out
that the strength of the hypothesis-testing approach lies in
its provision of a rigorous criterion for rejecting a particu-
lar relationship [27]. In contrast, they note that data-
driven approaches inevitably turn up many correlations
that turn out to be spurious. This contrast between the
higher rigor of hypothesis-testing and the greater likeli-
hood of spurious association in data-driven discovery
methods seems to me to be reasonable, but it should not
be taken to mean that data-driven methods are either bad
science or useful only when linked in tandem with hypo-
thesis-testing approaches.
It follows from the perspective we adopted in the intro-
ductory section of this paper on the philosophy of science
that scientific "verification" does not mean meeting a Car-
tesian criterion of certainty through a Popperian proce-
dure of elimination of false propositions via crucial
experiments. Instead, scientific verification means estab-
lishing a high probability that a stated relationship
between two phenomena provides a useful description
under a wide range of observational perspectives (ideally
most or all perspectives, but the ideals are achievable in
different degrees with different phenomena). "High" is
defined as sufficient for the uses to which it is to be put
and by having been tested using the available and feasible
means of examination. Such an approach leaves one with-
out the comfort of absolute cut-offs, but it still allows
comparison of "more" and "less", and achieving the
"more fully verified" position turns out to be sufficient for
progress in knowledge. Nonetheless, even within that
framework, a statistically significant association is not a
sufficient criterion for claiming a discovery has been
made.
In biological beings, the large number of components of
the phenomena sampled means that spurious associa-
tions are inevitable. If one tests a thousand alleles, with a
95% statistical cut-off, one can expect to produce around
50 spurious associations. Given the three billion base-
pairs in the human genome, the problem is inevitably
daunting. It cannot be repaired simply by raising the sta-
tistical cut-off, because that entails the well-known statis-
tical "power" problem, which involves the trade-off
between setting a criterion that is "too low", which falsely
identifies spurious associations, or setting a criterion "too
high", which fails to identify real but relatively weaker or
rarer associations (generally described as a trade-off
between "Type I" and "Type II" error). While there are cur-
rently rationales for different modes of adjustment for
"multiple testing", there are no definitive criteria, and
what is reasonable will undoubtedly vary by the empirical
qualities of the specific cases.
Several commentators have suggested that integrating the
inductive approaches of data "mining" with hypothesis-
driven experimentation can optimize the strengths of eachJournal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2007, 2:5 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/2/1/5
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approach [28-30]. That is, after one identifies a potential
discovery via data driven methods, one proceeds to tradi-
tional hypothesis-testing approaches. In some instances
this proves to be a sensible suggestion, but it should not
be taken to mean that inductive approaches are mere pre-
liminaries to the "real" scientific effort of hypothesis test-
ing, because hypothesis-testing procedures are also
subject to the problems raised by the similarity-based
nature of the highly complex beings of the biological
realm. As the arguments made by Kelley and Scott [31]
and of Kell and Oliver [29] begin to suggest, the model of
invariant laws constructed through crucial experiments
based on quantitatively described hypotheses does not
make up the bulk of biological research. Relatively few
experiments in biology are definitive, and relatively little
of the knowledge in biology takes the form of species-
invariant equations – not because biology is "immature"
but precisely because biological organisms diverge. The
existence of a particular phenomenon in one species does
not guarantee its existence in another, and different
organisms have evolved differently precisely to take
advantage of specific ecodynamics. A few quantitative
laws may cross most or all species, but most of the infor-
mation about biological organisms is necessarily non-uni-
versal. In physics, a single measurement was taken to be
definitive with regard to the non-existence of ether, only
two observations are routinely cited to support the claim
of gravitational lensing, and a small and (surprisingly)
indistinct set of measurements are used to support the
claim to the speed of light in a vacuum and the time-vari-
ation effect of relativity.
The luxury of drawing universal results from singular
experiments does not exist in biology. As soon as one
finds a phenomenon in one organism (and then species),
the search must begin to see whether and to what extent
the same phenomenon occurs in other species. This viti-
ates the notion of a crucial experiment that can establish
a generalization across the biological domain. Moreover,
the variation within biological organisms means that
answers to biologically-based hypotheses are almost
always judged using population-based statistical
approaches. These statistical approaches face the same
problems of trade-offs between "Type I" and "Type II
Erorr" ("power") that occur in data-driven approaches. In
practice, even the issue of multiple testing also arises, and
the problems are enhanced by the fact that the sample size
needed to adjudicate a test are frequently much larger
than any feasible sample [32] – in human disease
research, in some cases a larger sample size is needed than
the known cases of the disease. Because similarity-based
relations infect hypothesis testing as well as data-driven
research, the "solution" to the verifiability problem for
data-driven research cannot be merely to link the data-
driven procedures in tandem with experimentation.
Although experimentation may contribute part of the
complex verification process, another part is the develop-
ment of a set of criteria that indicate the likelihood of an
association based on the nature of biological associations.
This article suggests that a reasonable starting point for
identifying such criteria is the careful examination of the
specific features of similarity-based generalization proc-
esses as they have actually functioned in key biological
findings in which biologists have a good deal of confi-
dence. The case of the zinc finger proteins has provided
one example, which suggests as criteria the identification
of lumpy gradients of similarity, a form-function linkage,
a range of generality, and an evolutionary locus. Current
researchers are already taking some account of the issues
herein identified [33,34]. We are suggesting that more sys-
tematic integration of these features into the criteria for
publishing conclusions about biological causation might
further improve the reliability of data-driven research
results.
Conclusion
The idea that biological categories are similarity-based is
widely accepted at the level of practice. The failure to inte-
grate that idea into the philosophy of biology as a general
principle may have contributed to a variety of errant pre-
sumptions, especially false assumptions about the homo-
geneity of groups of human gene pools. Systematic
integration of the similarity-based categorization may
help to avoid wasteful and erroneous research projects, as
well as spurring insights about how to better take advan-
tage of all of the information available in biological data
sets. More broadly applied, such a vision may also help
integrate biological findings into our socio-cultural dis-
cussions in a fashion that accepts natural diversity rather
than effaces it.
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